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Abstract
This paper presents the Homeo-Heterostatic Value Gradients (HHVG) algorithm as
a formal account on the constructive interplay between boredom and curiosity which
gives rise to effective exploration and superior forward model learning. We envisaged
actions as instrumental in agent’s own epistemic disclosure. This motivated two central
algorithmic ingredients: devaluation and devaluation progress, both underpin agent’s
cognition concerning intrinsically generated rewards. The two serve as an instantiation of
homeostatic and heterostatic intrinsic motivation. A key insight from our algorithm is that
the two seemingly opposite motivations can be reconciled—without which exploration and
information-gathering cannot be effectively carried out. We supported this claim with
empirical evidence, showing that boredom-enabled agents consistently outperformed
other curious or explorative agent variants in model building benchmarks based on
self-assisted experience accumulation.
1 Introduction
In this study, we argue that action is instrumental in epistemic disclosure in and of
agent itself. The implication of this statement is twofold: (1) for agents whose innate
goal appeals to their own knowledge gain, the occurrence of curiosity rests upon the
presence of devaluation (and hence goal-directedness); (2) boredom—consequential to
devaluation—and curiosity entail a mutually reinforcing cycle for such kind of disclosure
to ensue.
Animal studies have shown that learning stimulus-response (S-R) association through
action-outcome reinforcement is but one facet of instrumental behaviour. Internally,
animals may build models that assign values to reappraise experienced outcomes. This
expands the landscape of instrumental behaviour to include stimulus-outcome-response
(S-O-R) learning system—or goal-directed learning [Balleine and Dickinson, 1998]. Goal-
directed behaviour is known in both empirical and computational approaches to support
adaptive and optimal action selection [Adams, 1982, Adams and Dickinson, 1981, Man-
nella et al., 2016]. Central to such behavioural adaptiveness is devaluation. This means
for a given action-outcome pair the associated reinforcing signal is no longer monotonic.
Instead, outcome value varies under reappraisal within according to their relevance to or
attainment of goal.
One classic paradigm of devaluation that shapes agent’s behavioural pattern is of
food via satiation. In the context of epistemic disclosure, an analogy can be drawn
between devaluation and the emergence of boredom, in which one’s assimilation of
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knowledge reduces the value of similar knowledge in future encounter. The relationship
between boredom and outcome devaluation has a long history in psychological research.
Empirical findings indicated that boredom is reportedly accompanied by negative affec-
tive experience, suggesting that experienced outcomes are intrinsically evaluated and
considered as less valuable Bench and Lench [2013], Fahlman et al. [2009], Perkins and
Hill [1985], van Tilburg and Igou [2012], Vodanovich et al. [1991]. Psychophysiological
studies also demonstrated that boredom plays an active role of information-seeking
behaviour. Subjects showing higher levels of reported boredom are accompanied by
increased autonomic arousal, such as heart rate and galvanic skin response. These
findings is in line with our key notion that boredom intrinsically and actively drives
agents learning behaviours [Harris, 2000, London et al., 1972]. Consistent with our
argument, evidence also showed that boredom is associated with increase in creativity
Harris [2000], Schubert [1977, 1978]. This suggests that the presence of boredom serves
to reconfigure agent’s instrumental device in order to escape devalued states.
Curiosity, irrespective of being a by-product of external goal-attainment or an implicit
goal in and of agent itself, is often ascribed to as a correlate of information-seeking
behaviour [Gottlieb et al., 2013]. Behaviours exhibiting curious quality are observed in
humans and animals alike, suggesting an universal role of curiosity in shaping one’s fitness.
Though the exact neural mechanism underlying the emergence of curious behaviour still
remains obscure, current paradigms have their focus on (1) novelty disclosure and (2)
uncertainty reduction aspects of information-seeking [Bellemare et al., 2016, Friston
et al., 2017, Ostrovski et al., 2017, Pathak et al., 2017]. Indeed, both aspects can be
argued to improve agent’s fitness in epistemic landscape if the agent elects to incorporate
the novelty or uncertainty.
In intrinsic motivation literature [Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2009], although one can
readily associate boredom with homeostatic motivation and curiosity with heterostatic
motivation, our argument suggests they can in fact be complementary. Our contribution
thus pertains to the reconciliation of homeo-heterstatic motivations.
2 Markov Decision Process
In what follows, we briefly review preliminaries for the ensuing algorithm. We focus on
well-established themes surrounding typical reinforcement learning, including Markov
Decision Process and value gradients as a policy optimisation technique.
In Markov Decision Process (MDP) one considers the tuple (S,A,R, P, pi, γ). S and
A are spaces of real vectors whose member, s ∈ S and a ∈ A, represent states (or sensor
values) and actions. R is some reward function defining the mapping R : S × A→ R.
The probabilities associated with states and actions are given by the forward model
P (S′|S = a, A = s) and the action policy pi(A|S = s). Throughout the paper we use
the ‘prime’ notation, e.g., s′, to represent one time step into the future: s′ = s(t+ 1).
The goal of MDP is to optimally determine the action policy pi∗ such that the
expected cumulative reward over a finite (or infinite) horizon is maximised. Considering
a finite horizon problem with discrete time, t ∈ [0, T ], this is equivalent to pi∗ =
arg maxpi Ea∼pi
[∑T
t=0 γ
tR(s(t),a(t))
]
, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor.
Many practical approaches for solving MDP often resort to approximating state-action
value q(a, s) or state value v(s) functions [Heess et al., 2015, Lillicrap et al., 2015, Mnih
et al., 2013, Sutton and Barto, 1998]. These value functions are given in the Bellman
equation
v(s) = Epi(a|s)
[
R(a, s) + γq(a, s)
]
= Epi(a|s)
[
R(a, s) + γEP (s′|a,s)[v(s′)]
] (1)
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When differentiable forward model and reward function are both available, policy
gradients can be analytically estimated using value gradients [Fairbank and Alonso, 2012,
Heess et al., 2015].
3 Homeo-Heterostatic Value Gradients
This section describes formally the algorithmic structure and components of the Homeo-
Heterostatic Value Gradients, or HHVG. The naming of HHVG suggests its connections
with homeostatic and heterostatic intrinsic motivations [Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2009].
A homeostatic motivation encourages an organism to occupy a set of predictable,
unsurprising states. Whereas, a heterostatic motivation does the opposite; curiosity
belongs to this category.
The algorithm offers reconciliation between the two seemingly opposite qualities
and concludes with their cooperative nature. Specifically, the knowledge an organism
maintains about its homeostatic boundary helps instigate outbound heterostatic drives.
In return, satisfying heterostatic drives broadens the organism’s boundary of comfort.
As a consequence, the organism not only improves its fitness in terms of homeostatic
outreach but also becomes effectively curious.
It is instructive to overview the nomenclature of the algorithm. We consistently
associate homeostatic motivation with the emergence of boredom, which reflects the result
of having incorporated novel information into one’s knowledge, thereby diminishing
the novelty to begin with. This is conceptually compatible with outcome devaluation
or induced satiety in instrumental learning. Devaluation progress is therefore referred
to as one’s epistemic achievement. That is, the transitioning of a priori knowledge to
one of having assimilated otherwise unknown information. The devaluation progress is
interpreted as an instantiation of intrinsic reward. The drive to maintain steady rewards
conforms to a heterostatic motivation.
An intuitive understanding of HHVG is visualised in Figure 1. Imagine the interplay
between a thrower and their counterpart — a catcher. The catcher anticipates where
the thrower is aiming and makes progress by improving its prediction. The thrower,
on the other hand, keeps the catcher engaged by devising novel aims. Over time, the
catcher knows well what the thrower is capable of, whilst the thrower has attempted a
wide spectrum of pitches.
In the algorithm, the thrower is represented by a forward model attached to a
controller (policy) and the catcher a “meta-model”. We unpack and report them
individually. Procedural information is summarised in Algorithm 1.
3.1 Forward model
We start by specifying at current time the state and action sample as s and a. The
forward model describes the probability distribution over future state S′, given s, a,
and parameter θ.
P (S′|A = a, S = s; θ) (2)
The entropy associated with S′, conditioned on s and a, gives a measure of the degree to
which S′ is informative on average. We referred to this measure as one of interestingness.
Note this is a different concept from the ‘interestingness’ proposed by Schmidhuber
[2008], which is the first-order derivative of compressibility.
3.2 Boredom, outcome devaluation, and meta-model
Boredom, in common understanding, is perhaps not unfamiliar to most under the
situation of being exposed to certain information which one has known well by heart.
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It is the opposite of being interested. In the current work, we limited the exposure of
information to those being disclosed by one’s actions.
To mark the necessity of boredom, we first identify the limitation of a naive instanti-
ation of curiosity; then, we show that the introduction of boredom serves to resolve this
limitation.
Consider the joint occurrence of future state S′ and action A: P (S′, A|S = s; θ, ϕ).
This is derived from product rule given Equation 2 and action policy pi(A|S = s;ϕ),
parametrised by ϕ (action policy is revisited in Section 3.4).
A naive approach to curiosity is by optimising the action policy, such that A is
predictive of maximum interestingness (see Section 3.1) about the future.
However, this approach would certainly lead to the agent behaving habitually and,
as a consequence, becoming obsessive about a limited set of outcomes. In other words, a
purely interestingness-seeking agent is a darkroom agent (see Section3.5; also Friston
et al. [2012] for related concept).
The problem with the naively curious agent is that it perceives novelty as permanently
novel. The agent has no recourse to inform itself via assimilating the information that
brought about novelty. If the agent is otherwise endowed with the assimilation capacity, a
sense of boredom would be induced. The induction of boredom essentially causes the agent
to value the same piece of information less, thus changing the agent’s perception towards
interestingness. If the agent were to pursue the same interestingness-seeking policy, a
downstream effect of boredom would drive the agent to seek out other information that
could have been known. This conception amounts to an implicit goal of devaluating
known outcomes.
To this end, we introduce the following meta-model Q to represent a priori knowledge
about the future. The meta-model, parametrised by ψ, is an approximation to the true
marginalisation of joint probability P (S′, A|S = s; θ, ϕ) over A:
Q(S′|S = s;ψ) ≈ P (S′|S = s; θ, ϕ)
=
∑
A
[
P (S′, A|s; θ, ϕ)
]
=
∑
A
[
P (S′|A, s; θ)pi(A|s;ϕ)
] (3)
We associate the occurrence of boredom, or, synonymously, outcome devaluation,
with minimising the devaluation objective with respect to ψ. The devaluation objective
is given by the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence:
Lmm(ψ) := L(a, s;ψ, θ)
= DKL [P (s
′|a, s; θ)‖Q(s′|s;ψ)] (4)
For the notation Lmm(ψ), where mm stands for meta-model, we have dropped the
dependence of θ, s, and a. This only serves to emphasise that optimising the devaluation
objective is with respect to ψ.
3.3 Devaluation progress, intrinsic reward, and value learning
Through the use of KL-divergence in Equation 4, we emphasise the complementary nature
of devaluation in relation to a knowledge-gaining process. That is to say, devaluation
results in information gain for the agent. This, in fact, can be regarded as cognitively
rewarding and, thus, serves to motivate our definition of intrinsic reward.
One rewarding scenario happens when Q(S′|s;ψ) has all the information there is to
be possessed by A about S′. A is therefore rendered redundant. One may speculate,
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at this point, the agent could opt for inhibiting its responses. Disengaging actions
potentially saves energy which is rewarding in biological sense.
Alternatively, the agent may attempt to develop new behavioural repertoires, brining
into S′ new information (i.e., novel outcomes) that is otherwise unknown to Q. The
ensuing sections will focus on this line of thinking.
From Equation 4, we construct the quantity devaluation progress to represent an
intrinsically motivated reward. The devaluation progress is given by the difference
between KL-divergences before and after devaluation (as indicated by the superscript
(i+ 1)):
R
(i+1)
ψ (a, s) := L(a, s;ψ(i), θ)− L(a, s;ψ(i+1), θ)
= Lmm(ψ(i))− Lmm(ψ(i+1)),
(5)
Here, we write R
(i+1)
ψ (a, s) in accordance with notational convention in reinforcement
learning, where reward is typically a function of state and action. Subscript ψ indicates
the dependence of R on meta model parameter.
Having established the intrinsic reward, value learning is such that the value function
approximator Vˆ (s; ν) follows the Bellman equation V (s) = Ea[R(a, s) + γEs′ [V (s′)]].
In practice, we minimise the objective with respect to ν:
Lvf (ν) := L(s′,a, s; ν)
=
∥∥∥y − Vˆ (s; ν)∥∥∥2
y = R
(i+1)
ψ (a, s) + γVˆ (s
′; ν˜)
(6)
3.4 Policy optimisation
We define action policy at state S = s as the probability distribution over A with
parameter ϕ:
pi(A|S = s;ϕ) (7)
Our goal is to determine the policy parameter ϕ that maximises the expected sum
of future discounted rewards. One approach is by applying Stochastic Value Gradients
[Heess et al., 2015] and maximises the value function. We thus define our policy objective
as follows (notice the negative sign; we used a gradient update rule that defaults to
minimisation):
Lap(ϕ) := L(s′,a, s; θ, ψ(i), ψ(i+1), ν, ϕ)
= −Ea∼pi(·|s;ϕ)
[
R
(i+1)
ψ (a, s) + γEs′∼P (·|a,s;θ)
[
Vˆ (s′; ν)
]] (8)
3.5 Remarks on homeostatic and heterostatic regulations
Oudeyer and Kaplan [2009] outlined the distinctions between two important classes of
intrinsic motivation: homeostatic and heterostatic. A homeostatic motivation is one
that can be satiated, leading to certain equilibrium behaviourally; whereas a heterostatic
motivation topples the agent, thus preventing it from occupying habitual states.
Our algorithm entails regulations relating to both classes of intrinsic motivation.
Specifically, the devaluation objective (Equation 4) realises the homeostatic aspect due
to its connection with induced satiety. On the other hand, the devaluation progress
(Equation 5) introduced for policy optimisation instantiates a heterostatic drive to agent’s
behavioural pattern.
Heterostasis is motivated by the agent pushing itself towards novelty and away from
devalued, homeostatic states (Equation 13). We develop this statement more formally
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by first re-examining Equation 8, with reference to Equation 5 and 4. We arrived at the
following form by admitting expected KL-divergence:
− Ea∼pi(·|s;ϕ)
[
DKL[P (s
′|a, s; θ)‖Q(s′|s;ψ(i))]−DKL[P (s′|a, s; θ)‖Q(s′|s;ψ(i+1))]
]
− Ea∼pi(·|s;ϕ)Es′∼P (·|a,s;θ)
[
V (s′; ν)
]
= −
{
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ, θ)− I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ, θ)
+ Ea∼pi(·|s;ϕ)Es′∼P (·|a,s;θ)
[
V (s′; ν)
]}
(9)
Notice that the expected devaluation progress becomes the difference between condi-
tional mutual information I before (ψ(i)) and after devaluation (ψ(i+1)).
Assume, for the moment, that the agent is equipped with devaluation capacity
only. In other words, we replace the devaluation progress and fall back on devaluation
objective, R := Lmm(ψ) (cf. Equation 5). The agent is now interestingness-seeking with
homeostatic regulation. We further suppose that the dynamics of ψ and ϕ evolve in
tandem, which gives
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ(k))→ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k))
→ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1))
→ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+2), ϕ(k+1))→ . . .
(10)
In practice, the nature of devaluation and policy optimisation often depends on replaying
agent’s experience. Taking turn applying gradient updates to ψ and ϕ creates a self-
reinforcing cycle that drives the policy to converge towards a point mass. For instance,
if the policy is modelled by some Gaussian distribution, this updating scheme would
result in infinite precision (zero spread).
For curiosity, however, such parameter dynamics should not be catastrophic if we
subsume the homeostatic regulation and ensure the preservation of the relation given in
Equation 11:
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k)) ≤ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ(k)) ≤ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1))
⇒ −I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k)) + I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ(k)) ≤ I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1))
(11)
This equation holds because the devaluation process on average has a tendency to make
A less informative about S′, after which A is perturbed to encourage a new S′ less
predictable to Q. By rearranging the equation such that the left hand side remains
positive, we have arrived at a lower bound on I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1)) which
recovers the expected devaluation progress.
Equation 12 summarises the argument associated with Equation 11 and 10.
ϕ(k+1) = arg max
ϕ(k)
[
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ(k))−min
ψ¯(i)
I(S′ : A|S = s; ψ¯(i), ϕ(k))
]
6= arg max
ϕ(k)
[
min
ψ(i)
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i), ϕ(k))
] (12)
Finally, we offer an intuition on how policy optimisation gives rise to heterostatic
motivation. This is made clear from the optimised target I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1)),
found on the right hand side of Equation 11. It is instructive to re-introduce the true
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marginalisation P (S′|S = s; θ, ϕ) from Equation 3; write:
I(S′ : A|S = s;ψ(i+1), ϕ(k+1))
=
∑
a
pi(a|s;ϕ(k+1))
∑
s′
P (s′|s,a; θ) log P (s
′|a, s; θ)
Q(s′|s;ψ(i+1))
=
∑
a
pi(a|s;ϕ(k+1))
∑
s′
P (s′|s,a; θ) log P (s
′|a, s; θ)
P (s′|s; θ, ϕ(k+1))
P (s′|s; θ, ϕ(k+1))
Q(s′|s;ψ(i+1))
= I(S′ : A|S = s;ϕ(k+1)) +DKL
[
P (s′|s; θ, ϕ(k+1))‖Q(s′|s;ψ(i+1))]
(13)
Simply, the optimised policy is such that the agent increases the conditional mutual
information and is pushed away (via increasing the KL-divergence) from its homeostatic
state Q.
4 Implementation Considerations
This section presents practical considerations when motivating the aforementioned agent
using neural networks. These considerations were mainly for the ease of calculating
KL-divergence analytically.
4.1 Forward model
We assumed, at the any given time, the state follows some Gaussian distribution with
mean s and covariance Σ. The future state is described by its mean s′ according to
the deterministic mapping s′ = f(a, s; θ), where a is the action sampled from policy. f
represents a neural network with trainable parameter θ:
f(a, s; θ) = As+
(∑
ι
aιB
ι
)
s+Ca+ o (14)
A, B, and C are approximations of Jacobian matrices and o a constant, all depending
on θ. B is a three-way tensor indexed by ι along the first axis. This treatment is similar
to Watter et al. [2015] (also cf. Karl et al. [2016]), except that we considered a bilinear
approximation and that, in the following sections, we used only the mean states in a
deterministic environment.
The above formalism follows that s′ has covariance matrix E[ss′ᵀ] = JΣJᵀ, where
J = (A+
∑
ι aιB
ι). The transition probability is then given by
P (S′|A = a, S = s; θ) = N (f(a, s; θ),JΣJᵀ) (15)
4.2 Meta model
Our meta model was defined as Q(S′|S = s;ψ) = N(µ′,Σ′;ψ), where mean µ′ and
covariance matrix Σ′ are outputs of a neural network parametrised by ψ. Specifically,
the covariance matrix is constructed as follows:
Σ′ = HDHᵀ, D = diag(d)
H = I − 2 vv
ᵀ
‖v‖2 ,
(16)
where d is a positive-valued vector, I an identity matrix, and v a Householder vector
[Tomczak and Welling, 2016].
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Whenever possible, e.g., employing Experience Replay, gradients of the objective
may be weighted by the probability ratio P (s′|a, s; θ(`+1))/P (s′|a, s; θ(`)), where the
superscripts (`+ 1) and (`) indicate forward model parameters after and before gradient
updates. This procedure encourages boredom to be properly induced in accordance with
forward model learning.
5 Experiment
To verify whether our algorithm exhibits online curiosity, we focused on benchmarking
agent’s forward model under these constraints: i) agent should learn to bootstrap its own
training set; ii) the probability of visiting different states is not uniformly distributed;
iii) the amount of time to accumulate training data points is limited.
Boredom-based benchmarks were compared 1) against (ideal) models trained using
oracle dataset, and 2) with reduced models under the pruning hierarchy (Section 5.3,
Table 1).
5.1 Training environment
Our agents were tested in a physics simulator, free of stochasticity, built to expand the
classical Mountain Car environment (e.g., ‘MountainCar-v0’ included in Brockman et al.
[2016]) into two-dimensional state space. The environment is analogous to the Mountain
Car in ways that it has attractors and repellers that resemble hill- and valley-like
landscapes (Figure 2). The presence of both structures serves as acceleration modifier
to the agent. This makes state visitation biased toward attractors. Therefore, the
acquisition of an accurate forward model necessitates planning visits to the vicinity of
repellers.
The states an agent can occupy were defined as the tuple (x, y, x˙, y˙) in continuous
real space. Positions (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 were bounded in a unit square, whereas velocities
(x˙, y˙) were not. Boundary condition resets x and y to zero velocities. However, it is
possible for the agent to slide along the boundaries if its action goes in the direction
parallel to the nearby boundary. We note that being trapped in the corners is possible;
though an agent could potentially get itself unstuck if appropriate actions were carried
out.
Agent’s action policy was represented by a categorical distribution over accelerations
in x and y directions. The distribution was defined on the interval [−2.0, 2.0]2, evenly
divided into a 11× 11 grid. When an action is selected, the corresponding acceleration
is modified according to forces exerted by the attractors and repellers.
Unlike the classical Mountain Car, our environment does not express external rewards,
nor does it possess any states that are indicative of termination. Agents were allowed
a pre-defined time limit (T = 30, 000 steps; Data Accumulation Phase or DAP) to act
without interruption. Agent’s experiences in terms of state transitions were collected in a
database, which was sampled from for training at each step. During DAP, learning rates
for model parameters remained constant. After DAP (or post-DAP), agent entered an
action-free stage lasted for T = 30, 000, during which only sampling from own experience
pool for forward model training was performed. Learning rate scheduling scheme was
implemented at post-DAP.
5.2 Oracle dataset
To contrast with self-assisted data accumulation, we constructed an oracle dataset, with
which a (forward) model was trained. We referred to this class of model as Oracle. The
oracle dataset assumed unbiased state occupancy and action choice. Specifically, we
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acquired the dataset by evenly dividing the state-action space into a 49× 49× 11× 11×
11× 11 grid. Each state-action pair was passed to the physics simulator to evaluate the
future state. The oracle dataset differs from self-assisted ones in that contained positions
near the repellers that an agent is incapable of visiting.
The training, testing, and validation sets were prepared by re-sampling the resulting
dataset without replacement according to the ratio 0.8, 0.16, and 0.04. The model was
trained for 60, 000 epochs. During training, the learning rate was scheduled according
to test error. Benchmarking was performed on the validation set as part of model
comparisons (see Section 5.4).
5.3 Model pruning
We defined five variants of our boredom-driven curious agent. With each variation, the
agent receives cumulative reductions in network components. Theses reductions are
summarised as model pruning hierarchy in Table 1.
The reason that we motivated model comparisons based on model pruning is as
follows. Overall, as model pruning progresses the agent was deprived of connections with
constructs like devaluation progress, intrinsic motivation, and planning. Eventually, the
agent lost the ability to contextualise action selection and became a random-walk object.
At the stage, the agent was still explorative in a crude sense, albeit not in a curious
way. Through these treatments we demonstrated the impact boredom and intrinsic
motivation have on model learning.
5.3.1 Boredom-driven curiosity (C/B)
The first agent variant retained all distinctive components introduced in Section 3. The
meta-model provides the devaluation progress as intrinsic rewards, whilst the value
function enables the agent to plan actions that are intrinsically rewarding in the long
run.
5.3.2 Predictive error-driven curiosity (C/PE)
The C/PE variant tests whether the induction of boredom is a constructive form of
intrinsic motivation. This is achieved by removing the meta-model, thereby requiring
an alternative definition of intrinsic reward. We replaced the devaluation progress with
learning progress defined by mean squared errors of the forward model:
R
(`+1)
θ := Lfm(θ(`))− Lfm(θ(`+1))
Lfm(θ) := L(s′,a, s; θ)
= ‖s′ − f(a, s; θ)‖2
(17)
The construction of learning progress is one typical approach to intrinsic motivation and
curiosity [Pathak et al., 2017, Schmidhuber, 1991].
5.3.3 Policy gradients, intrinsic reward samples (PG/IRS), Gaussian re-
wards (PG/GR)
Next, we examined how reward statistics alone influences policy update and, as a
consequence, model learning. The value function was removed at this stage to dissociate
policy learning from any downstream effects of value learning.
One distinctive feature of devaluation progress is that it entails time-varying rewards
— depending on the amount of time over which an agent has evolved in the environment.
We hypothesised that the emergence of curious policy is associated with reward dynamics
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over time. That is to say, if one perturbs the magnitudes and directions of the policy
gradients with reward statistics appropriate for the ongoing time frame, the agent should
exhibit similar curious behaviours. Nevertheless, we argue that such treatment is only
sensible given virtually identical initial conditions. Specifically, all agent variants shared
the same, environmental configuration, initial position, and network initialisation.
To this end, we prepared a database for intrinsic reward samples. During C/B
performance, all reward samples were collected and labelled with the corresponding
time step. Afterwards, the PG/IRS agents randomly sampled from the database in a
temporally synchronised manner and applied standard policy gradients.
The PG/IRS was contrasted with the PG/GR variant. Their difference lies in that a
surrogate reward was used in place of the database. We defined the surrogate reward
as a Gaussian distribution with time-invariant parameters, in which the mean µ = 0 is
under the assumption of equilibrium devaluation progress and the standard deviation
σ = 0.01, as derived from the entire database.
5.3.4 Random-walk policy (P/RW)
Finally, we constructed a random-walk agent. All network components, apart from the
forward model, were removed. This agent variant represents the case without intrinsic
motivation and is agnostic to curiosity. Broadly speaking, the agent was still explorative
due to its maximum entropy action policy. We regarded this version as the worse case
scenario to contrast with the rest of the variants.
5.4 Model comparisons
All model variants were compared on the basis of validation error given the oracle dataset.
We performed 128 runs for each of the six variants (Oracle, C/B, C/PE, PG/IRS, PG/GR,
and P/RW). All variants, across all runs, were assigned to identical environmental
configuration (e.g., initial position, attractor/repeller placements). Network components,
whenever applicable, shared identical architecture and were trained with consistent batch
size and learning rate. Model parameters followed the Xavier initialisation [Glorot and
Bengio, 2010]. During post-DAP, learning rate scheduling was implemented such that a
factor 0.1 reduction was applied upon a 3000-epoch loss plateau.
6 Results
We first characterised individual agent variants’ qualities of being i) explorative and ii)
perseverative. Active exploration is one defining attribute of curiosity [Gottlieb et al.,
2013], simply because it differentiates between uncertain and known situations, thus
giving rise to effective information acquisition. This, however, should be complemented
with bounded perseverance; namely, to prevent oneself from being permanently or
dynamically captured—i.e., by the corners or the attractor.
The two qualities can be distinguished, as shown in Figure 3, by respective measures
of Coverage Rate (CR) and Coverage Entropy (CE). The two measures were computed
by first turning the state space into a 50× 50 grid, ignoring velocities. CR then marks
over time whether or not a cell has been visited. Whereas, CE treats the grid as a
probability distribution. Starting with maximum entropy, CR cumulatively counts the
number of times a position is being visited. Entropy was calculated at each time step
using normalised counter.
Because (state) visitation bias was inherent in our testing environment, naturally,
agents occupying a subset of states would cause CE to reduce faster than those who
attempted to escape. The C/B, C/PE, and PG/IRS variants were regarded as curious
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and intrinsically motivated. Our results showed that these variants were predominantly
explorative and non-perseverative. By contrast, the P/RW agent, albeit explorative, had
no principled means to escape the dynamic lock. However, if t→∞ the P/RW should
be able to explore further by chance. The PG/GR variant, on the other hand, exhibited,
intermediate explorativeness and extreme perseverance with disproportionately high
variance. We attributed this behaviour to the detrimental effects of inappropriately
informative reward statistics.
Next, we benchmarked forward model performance of individual variants by their
validation loss and error percentage. We reported DAP and post-DAP performances
separately as a function of time in Figure 4. Error percentage was calculated as the
percent ratio between root mean squared loss and the maximum pair-wise Euclidean
distance in the validation set.
The Oracle model, trained under the supervision of oracle training set, reached an
error percentage of 0.84% for both DAP and post-DAP, amounting to approximately
30% improvement over the terminal performance of C/B variant. All variants considered
curious (C/B, C/PE, and PG/IRS) had similar performances during DAP. In particular,
the PG/IRS, which received independent intervention from the ‘true’ reward distributions
achieved marginally lower performance but indistinguishable from the C/PE variant.
This outcome was observed for both DAP and post-DAP, suggesting intrinsic reward
samples derived from C/B contributed favourably even to the standard policy gradients
algorithm.
Though without the ability to approximate value function, the PG/IRS variant
underperformed in benchmarking, as compared with the value-enabled, C/B variant.
Using non-parametric test, the difference was detected for DAP (p = 0.0006) and post-
DAP (p = 6.4E-8), respectively. Similar observations were also made for comparisons
between C/B and C/PE, at p = 0.0029 (DAP) and p = 5.9E-5 (post-DAP). Overall, this
suggested significant differences in the experiences accumulated across agent variants.
The aforementioned statistics were reported in Table 2 and 3.
7 Conclusion
We have provided a formal account on the emergence of boredom from an information-
seeking perspective and addressed its constructive role in enabling curious behaviour.
We envisaged actions as instrumental in agent’s epistemic disclosure, which is assimilated
by another conditionally independent cognitive process. This led to the central claim of
this study—pertaining to superior data-gathering efficiency and hence effective curiosity.
We supported this claim with empirical evidence, showing that boredom-enabled agents
consistently outperformed other curious agents in self-assisted world model learning.
Our results solicited the interpretation that the relationship between homeostatic and
heterostatic intrinsic motivations can in fact be complementary; therefore, we have
offered one unifying perspective for the intrinsic motivation landscape.
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Figure captions
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Got bored? 
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Figure 1. Intuitive understanding of the Homeo-Heterostatic Value Gradients (HHVG)
algorithm. [A] The algorithm can be interpreted as the cooperative interplay between a
thrower (kid; blue) and a catcher (dog; red). The thrower is equipped with a forward
model that estimates its aiming and is controlled by an action policy. Without knowing
the thrower’s policy, the catcher (meta-model), in order to make good catches, infers where
the thrower is aiming on average. [B] The catcher is interested in novel, unpredicted
throws. Whenever the catcher improves its predictive power some intrinsic reward
(devaluation progress) is generated. [C] As the catcher progresses further, similar throws
become highly predictable, thus inducing a sense of boredom. [D] To make the interplay
interesting again, the thrower is driven to devise new throws, so that the catcher can
afford to make further progress. By repeating [A–B] the thrower has attempted diverse
throws and known well about its aim. At the same time, the catcher will assume a
vantage point for any throw.
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Figure 2. Environmental configuration. The red cross represents attractor, whilst
black triangles repellers. Vector plots indicate the forces exerted if the agent assumed
the positions with zero velocities. The initial position is set at the blue letter ‘A’. This
configuration remains identical cross all model variants and test runs.
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Figure 3. Coverage Rate (CR) and Coverage Entropy (CE) by agent variants. The two
measures were computed by first turning the state space into a 50× 50 grid, ignoring
velocities. CR then marks over time whether or not a cell has been visited. Whereas,
CE treats the grid as a probability distribution. Starting with maximum entropy, CR
cumulatively counts the number of times a position is being visited. Entropy was
calculated at each time step using normalised counter. [A] Overview of CR shows the
distinction between curious and non-curious agents. Curiosity caused the agents to
explore faster. [B] Close-up on the curious agent variants, which were equally explorative.
[C] Overview of CE shows agents with different levels of perseverance. The P/RW
variants were captured by the attractor, whilst the PG/GR variants were prone to
blockage. [D] Close-up on curious agents, which were characterised by higher CE due
to attractor avoidance and more frequent repeller visitation attempts. Shaded regions
represent one standard deviation.
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Figure 4. Benchmarking model variants with oracle dataset. Performances were
reported in error percentage (also, see Table 2). [A] Performance as a function of
time during Data Accumulation Phase (DAP). [B] Close-up on curious variants (C/B,
C/PE, and PG/IRS), as well as policy gradients (PG/GR) informed by surrogate reward
statistics. The C/PE and PG/IRS variants performed similarly, but differed significantly
from C/B (Table 3). [C] Performance over time during post-DAP. [D] Close-up on
post-DAP performances for curious variants and PG/GR.
18/21
Tables
Table 1. Model pruning hierarchy. Ticks mark the existence or dependence of trainable
network component; circles indicate independent intervention. Top row: P/RW, random-
walk policy; PG/GR, policy gradients with rewards drawn from Gaussian distribution;
PG/IRS, policy gradients with intrinsic reward samples; C/PE, curiosity using forward
model error; C/B, curiosity from boredom. First column: FM, forward model; AP,
action policy; IR, intrinsic rewards; VF, value function approximator; MM, meta-model.
Oracle P/RW PG/GR PG/IRS C/PE C/B
FM X X X X X X
AP © X X X X
IR © X X
VF X X
MM X
Table 2. Summary statistics on validation loss and error percentage as benchmarking
scores. Key: DAP, Data Accumulation Phase; SD, standard deviation. For agent codes,
see Table 1.
Agent
DAP Post-DAP
MSE loss (SD) Mean Percent
Error (SD)
MSE loss (SD) Mean Percent
Error (SD)
Oracle
0.0008 0.8430 0.0008 0.8428
(2.3E-5) (0.0123) (2.2E-5) (0.0114)
C/B
0.0033 1.7181 0.0017 1.2420
(0.0006) (0.1357) (0.0001) (0.0488)
C/PE
0.0035 1.7611 0.0019 1.2882
(0.0006) (0.1464) (0.0003) (0.0916)
PG/IRS
0.0035 1.7637 0.0020 1.2976
(0.0006) (0.1418) (0.0003) (0.0902)
PG/GR
0.0048 2.0559 0.0030 1.6288
(0.0017) (0.3026) (0.0008) (0.2140)
P/RW
0.6663 22.2734 0.6615 22.1453
(0.3904) (10.0085) (0.3864) (10.0775)
Table 3. Non-parametric statistical tests comparing terminal performance at DAP and
post-DAP for curious model variants.
Mann-Whitney U Test (n = 128, α = 0.025, Bonferroni corrected)
Validation loss DAP (T = 30000) Post-DAP (T = 60000)
C/B < C/PE
Statistics 6558.0 5911.0
p-value 0.0029 5.9E-5
C/B < PG/IRS
Statistics 6275.0 5062.0
p-value 0.0006 6.4E-8
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Algorithms
Algorithm 1 Homeo-heterostatic value gradients
1: Variables
outer loop time t
gradient step counter `, i, j, k
state st := s(t) and action at := a(t)
learning rate λθ, λψ, λν , λϕ
discount factor γ
experience pool D
2: Models and parameters
forward model P (S′|s,a; θ)
meta-model Q(S′|s;ψ)
value apprximator Vˆ (s; ν)
action policy pi(A|s;ϕ)
3: Objectives
forward-model learning Lfm(θ)
meta-model learning Lmm(ψ) . Eq.4
value learning Lvf (ν) . Eq.6
policy learning Lap(ϕ) . Eq.8
4: for t = 0 . . . T do
5: From st, sample action at ∼ pi(·|st;ϕ)
6: Perform at and advance to st+1
7: Insert tuple
(
st,at, pi(at|st), st+1) into D
8: Sample D and train forward model:
9: Lfm(θ) := L(s′,a, s; θ) = ‖s′ − f(a, s; θ)‖2 . Eq.14
10: θ(`+1) ← θ(`) − λθ∇θLfm(θ(`))
11: Value learning (M updates, see Algorithm 2)
12: Sample D and perform devaluation:
13: ψ(i+1) ← ψ(i) − λψ∇ψLmm(ψ(i))
14: Sample D and train action policy:
15: evaluate R
(i+1)
ψ = Lmm(ψ(i))− Lmm(ψ(i+1))
16: evaluate Vˆ ′ = Vˆ (s′; ν(j+M))
17: w ← pi(a|s;ϕ(k))/pi(a|s;ϕ(<k))
18: ϕ(k+1) ← ϕ(k) + λϕ∇ϕwLap(ϕ(k)) given R(i+1)ψ , Vˆ ′
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Algorithm 2 Fitted Policy Evaluation (cf. Heess et al. [2015])
1: Given
outer loop time t
experience pool D
value function V (s; ν(j))
gradient step counter i, j, k
2: Clone parameter ν˜ ← ν(j)
3: for m = 1 . . .M do
4: Sample
(
sτ ,aτ , pi(aτ |sτ ;ϕ(<k)), sτ+1) from D (τ < t)
5: Evaluate R
(i+1)
ψ = Lmm(ψ(i))− Lmm(ψ(i+1))
6: y = R
(i+1)
ψ + γVˆ (s
τ+1; ν˜)
7: w = pi(aτ |sτ ;ϕ(k))/pi(aτ |sτ ;ϕ(<k))
8: Apply updates ν(j+m) ← ν(j+m−1) −∇ν w2
(
y − V (s; ν(j+m−1)))2
9: Every C updates, ν˜ ← ν(j+m)
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